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13.1Introduction
The sociology of mental health makes an important contribution to debates about psychopathology by shifting the focus of attention away from individual minds and behavior and toward the social and cultural context in which these are embedded (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). Whereas colleagues in psychiatry and moral philosophy attempt to identify the distinguishing features of the sociopath, such as a lack of moral understanding, empathy, and responsibility and other presumed psychological deficits, sociology’s concern is with the social processes through which such criteria are decided upon and used to categorize groups of people. Bracketing out (without dismissing) the question of whether or not those labeled sociopathic represent a distinct psychological type, or possess unique mental characteristics, the discipline looks instead to societal reactions to rule -breaking, analyzing the extent to which presumed mental disorder can be viewed as mere social deviance (Busfield 2001; Kendeall 2002), or the medicalization of “‘badness”’ (Conrad 2007). Disorder labels, categories, and criteria vary historically and cross-culturally, in line with changing social norms and values: Bbehavior is only defined as ‘ “mad’” or abnormal in relation to presumptions about normality, reason, and rationality (Foucault 1965).
In this respect, some sociologists argue that notions of mental disorder are socially constructed rather than objectively ‘ “real’” and empirically measurable. Critical psychiatry (Ingleby 2004) and anti-psychiatry (Szasz 1961/1972; Laing 1965; Scheff 1966) have had a significant influence upon this perspective, pointing to the ‘ “myth’” of mental illness as a misleading metaphor for mere norm violation (Szasz, ibid.). Many conditions lie on the ‘ “contested boundaries’” between mental disorder, physical illness, and social deviance (Busfield 1996), and so have an ambiguous status. Critics also point to the power of psychiatry as an institution, whose ultimate function is are social control, through the containment of those seen to pose a threat to social order (Scull 1979).
The reality or otherwise of mental illness remains highly disputed (Roth and Kroll 1986), but recent research argues for a less radical approach that encourages interdisciplinary dialogue. Social realism, for example, defends the idea of an underlying psychopathology, but argues that this can only be conceptualized through cultural discourses (Pilgrim and Rogers and Pilgrim 2010; Busfield 1996). Values-Based Medicine (VBM; Fulford et al. 2002), the approach taken in this chapter, recognizes that subjectivity, values, and bias inevitably shape understandings of mental disorder, at every stage of the clinical encounter, but that this does not discredit the good intentions of those working in psychiatric services. Rather than viewing mental health professionals cynically as agents of social control, we can look more sympathetically at the difficult positions they may be forced into by the prevailing political climate. Furthermore, VBM argues for a more open dialogue between practitioners and clients, who might share their concerns in a democratized process of service evaluation (Woodbridge and Fulford 2004, 32).
As an illustrative case study, I present a discussion of the contested concept, dDangerous and Ssevere pPersonality Ddisorder (DSPD), which arose within a particular historical, political, and cultural context of mental health legislation in the United Kingdom (Morgan 2004; Corbett and Westwood 2005; Manning 2006). DSPD is closely related to notions of psychopathy and sociopathy, referring to people who are thought to be capable of extremely violent or aggressive behavior as a direct result of a personality disorder, typically aAnti-Ssocial pPersonality Ddisorder (Department of Health 2002). Crucially, however, it is not a clinical, diagnostic category in itself, and does not appear in either the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (fourth edition, text revision)DSM-IV-TR or the International Classification of Diseases (tenth revisionICD-10) classification systems. Rather it is an administrative label that was produced by the UK government in the early twenty-fir21st century, in response to a media-fuelled moral panic (Cohen 1972) about supposedly ‘ “dangerous’” individuals. As detailed below, this construction of a pseudo-scientific category occurred through a traceable sequence of political events, and was viewed with skepticism by those working in mental health services (Maden and Tyrer 2003; Manning 2006; Scott et al. 2011). Uncertain of whether the condition actually existed, and therefore the extent to which they had a duty of care toward those so labeled, these professional groups were left in a difficult position—ethically, socially, and personally—as they struggled to make risk assessments and treatment decisions about those presumed to have DSPD.
13.2Background: Tthe Ssocial Ccreation of DSPD
The term DSPD first appeared in the UK government’s Green Paper, ‘ “Managing Dangerous pPeople with Severe Personality Disorders’,,” where it was defined as ‘ “… people with severe personality disorder who because of their disorder, pose a risk of serious offending’” (Home Office and the Department of Health 1999, 10). This occurred in the context of a media-fuelled furor surrounding a high- profile criminal case against Michael Stone, who was convicted of murder shortly after being released from hospital on the grounds that his personality disorder was untreatable (for a more detailed discussion, see Maden 2007). This resulted in a review of UK mental health law and successive drafts of a new Mental Health Bill (Department of Health 2002;, 2004). It provoked political debates about risk and dangerousness, as well as ethical debates about whether it was more important to protect individual freedom or public safety. The government’s subsequent White Paper stated that, ‘ “Concerns of risk will always take precedence, but care and treatment provided under formal powers should otherwise reflect the best interests of the patient’” (Department of Health 2000:, Ppart I, pParagraph 2 [16]).
The conceptualization of DSPD is problematic because it does not refer to any tangible symptoms or signs, but rather to perceptions of the individual’s character which are highly subjective. The condition is constructed by a set of predictive indicators of dangerousness and risk; clinicians are expected to assess the clients’s potential for violent or intimidating behavior, rather than their actual history of it, and estimate the threat they might pose to public safety. This evokes wider arguments about the cultivation of a risk society (Beck 1992), based upon the anticipation, rational calculation, and attempted management of future hazards (Lupton 1999; Corbett and Westwood 2005). Risk assessment, risk appraisal, and the construction of risk profiles for potential offenders are powerful tools in the discursive armory of politicians and policy makers, serving the function of population governance (Rose 1989; Wolff 2002). Whereas Foucault (1976/1980) pointed to the expansion of judicial power-–knowledge into extra-judicial spaces, such as forensic medicine (Morgan 2004), the case of DSPD demonstrates how this in turn drives the expansion of medical/psychiatric power–-knowledge into erstwhile extra-clinical spaces of social deviance.
In November 2006 a Bbill was introduced to Parliament to amend rather than replace the 1983 Mental Health Act (House of Lords 2006). A particularly controversial issue remained, however, in that the old ‘ “treatability test’” (which required that patients suffering with psychopathic disorder could only be detained if a treatment was available that was ‘ “… likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration’” of a condition) was to be replaced by an ‘ “appropriate treatment test’..” The final version of this Bbill, passed in July 2007, included the following criterion for detention:
… appropriate treatment is available (that medical treatment is available which is appropriate in the patient’s case, taking into account the nature or degree of his [sic] mental disorder and all other circumstances of his case). (Mental Health Act Commission 2007, clauses 4–-6)
Furthermore, the term ‘ “medical treatment’” here was defined as that which is intended ‘ “… to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations’” (Ppart 1, Cchapter 1, Pparagraph 7 [4]). That is, the condition itself need not be deemed treatable,; merely its effects, which could include the risk of violence or harm to others. As in the original 1983 Act (Department of Health 1983), the term ‘ “medical treatment’” includes ‘ “… nursing, psychological intervention and specialist mental health habilitation, rehabilitation and care’” (sSection 145).
The view of psychiatrists throughout these debates was one of skepticism and uncertainty about whether DSPD exists, and if so, whether its potential treatability lies within their remit (Fallon Report 1999; Morgan 2004). A widespread criticism cited in psychiatric journals was that the UK government, a non-medical institution, had imposed a quasi-diagnosis upon them and effectively asked them to act as agents of social control. For example, Mullen (2007), a forensic psychiatrist, spoke of the DSPD program having been ‘ “… born out of an ill-conceived attempt to hide the imposition of preventive detention and indefinite sentences behind the veneer of respectability provided by a mental health context’..” Tyrer (2007) similarly reviewed his colleagues’ concerns about the ethical implications of detaining people for long periods (Moran 2001) and of giving doctors unlimited powers over their patients’ freedom (Haddock et al. 2001). Nevertheless, Tyrer suggests that these concerns have faded somewhat in recent years, as psychiatrists have become resigned to the fact that they will have to deal with this client group eventually. Within forensic psychiatry, in particular, there is a cautious acceptance of DSPD as having some kind of reality, and a belief that some manifestations of such severe personality disorders may be treatable. Indeed, Mullen (2007) tempers his own criticism with an espousal of DSPD services as ‘ “… an exciting initiative for providing effective services to a group of offenders with mental illness who psychiatry, and the justice services, have so long ignored’..” Nevertheless, considerable disquiet remains about the nature of psychopathy in general and DSPD in particular: namely, whether we can assess risk or predict ‘ “dangerousness’” (and if so, how), and the likelihood of any therapeutic services offered succeeding in reducing the number of offenses committed by these individuals (Mullen 2007).
13.3Methods and Ddata
The data presented here come from a Wellcome Trust–-funded study that I carried out with four colleagues in the United Kingdom (Scott et al. 2011). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 46forty-six mental health professionals in two community mental health teams (CMHTs), a medium secure unit and a Ppersonality Ddisorder psychotherapy service in the south of England (for reasons of access and practicality). These included general adult psychiatrists (6), forensic psychiatrists (5), psychotherapists (1), generic psychologists (4), forensic psychologists (2), social workers (12), community psychiatric nurses (CPNs; ) (12), and occupational therapists (OTs; (4). The interviews began with a fictional vignette about a person (named ‘Stephen’) who showed many of the characteristics of DSPD. This was designed to elicit discussion around how such a person might be categorized, the issues this case would raise, how such decisions had been made in the respondents’ actual practice, the questionable treatability of DSPD, and how its features might differ from those of other conditions (e.g., psychosis or other types of personality disorder). The interviews were tape- recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using Atlas.ti software. In the “Rresults” section below, the reference number given in parenthesis following interview quotations refers to the interviewee.
Using the analytic approach of VBM, I show how these respondents cited many different models of sociopathy, not simply those that reflected their occupational training. Practitioners dreaw upon a repertoire of values, both implicit and explicit, which couldan be modified, combined, and discarded according to their clinical experience, collective decision-making processes, and practical constraints upon their work. In the discussion below, I refer to the different values held by our respondents, based upon Columbo et al.’s (2003) six models of mental disorder. The medical model focuses on physical symptoms and their treatment with drugs or surgery, and assumes that mental illness has biochemical or genetic causes. The social model views mental disorder as a stress response to living in difficult social conditions, such as poverty, poor housing, and social exclusion. The cognitive–-behavioral model refers to sets of learned behaviors or patterns of cognition that are abnormal and impaired, but which can be unlearned in therapy. The psycho-therapeutic model interprets the meaning of symptoms using psychoanalytic theories, often referring to traumatic experiences in early childhood. The family model shifts the focus of attention away from the individuals to their family unit, which is seen as needing therapeutic support to change its patterns of interaction. Finally, the conspiratorial model echoes theories of anti-psychiatry by claiming that mental illness is merely a misnomer for the medicalization of social deviance.
13.4Results
13.4.1DSPD as a Ccontested Cconcept
The majority of the mental health professionals were sckeptical of the existence and status of DSPD. Although they could identify features of other, recognized, personality disorders in the vignette, they remained wary of applying the DSPD label to clients as a diagnostic category. This may reflect the clinicians’ awareness of the political context in which the term had emerged, which cast doubt on its status as a mental disorder. As one psychiatrist put it:
I am a bit cynical about this whole thing. What I feel is that they are dragging psychiatrists to give a label to certain people so that they can lock them away. I think that that is not right; it is not our job. (2/044).
A forensic psychiatrist agreed that:
… psychopathic disorder isn’t a diagnosis. It is just a hotchpotch category and you can make just about anybody fit that if you really want to, if they have committed a grossly irresponsible act. (F 34).
The practitioners were reluctant to detain people who had committed violent offencses and appeared to be suffering from a personality disorder, on the basis that this behavior could be interpreted in different ways; their ‘ “dangerousness’” could be attributed to ‘ “badness’” rather than ‘ “madness’..” Another psychiatrist said:
This is a new concept and everybody has got their own ideas about risk, really. More than in any other branch of medicine, in psychiatry there is so much inter-rater discrepancy that I don’t think anybody is going to agree on which one would fit that [category]. It will be very, very subjective. (2/049).
Some respondents had similar reservations about the concept of ‘ “therapeutic benefit’..” This was suggested in the 2000 White Paper as a criterion for detention, replacing ‘ “treatability’” and acting as a precursor to the notion of ‘ “appropriate treatment’..” For those detained because of a presumed risk to others rather than to themselves, a care plan was required to ‘ “… treat the underlying disorder and/or to manage the behaviors arising from the disorder’” (Ssection 3.4); in the latter case, this would not necessarily entail a direct therapeutic benefit to the patient. The White Paper also referred to a ‘ “therapeutic environment’” in which such people would be held, and to ‘ “… the provision of interventions that are specifically designed to ameliorate the behaviors that cause them to be a risk to others’” (section 3.6). This provided doctors with much greater powers of detention by widening the scope of cases to which the criteria could be applied: tTherapeutic benefit could be interpreted as meaning mere containment of the individual to protect the public, without the need for treatment.
The possibility that treatability would be reduced from a necessary condition of detainment to just one option among many would mean that psychiatric care could become a matter of managing social problems as much as individual ones: sSsafety would take precedence over clients’ individual rights. This created ethical dilemmas for the clinicians, who felt uneasy about detaining people on these grounds, and so making the decisions collectively within a multi-disciplinary team helped to share the burden of responsibility. As one psychologist reflected:
The danger is that it would be called a therapeutic environment but it would actually be a coercive environment… It is an ethical question, isn’'t it? Weighing up the benefits against the harm…. I think it is a terribly difficult ethical question when you are talking about long-term deprivation of liberty. I certainly wouldn’'t be wanting to make any of those decisions on my own. (2/043).
13.4.2Values and Ssubjectivity
Given this uncertainty, many of the respondents said that they made decisions not only on the basis of ‘ “objective’” medical evidence, risk assessment instruments, and occupational training, but also by attending to their subjective emotional reactions to clients. However useful their risk assessment inventories were, it was impossible to predict with certainty who would pose a serious risk of harm, and so, in addition to their professional training, the clinicians developed an additional repertoire of intuitive, case-based knowledge. Social workers and Community Psychiatric Nurses (CPNs) were particularly likely to admit this, as, for example, onea CPN said:
There isn’'t a tick box answer with people… It has to go hand-in-hand with experience and skill and I still think gut feeling. Of course you can’'t run a service on a load of gut feeling but it certainly helps. (2/042).
These ‘ “gut feelings’” about patients were generally negative, and pertained not only to the assessment of risk to others but also to the difficulties these patients caused to services. Clinicians spoke of experiencing fear, suspicion, and general dislike toward the most aggressive and/or unrepentant individuals, and found it particularly hard to deal with these clients’ emotional indifference. Sometimes an individual would be able to say all of the ‘ “right’” things to indicate that they were not a danger to themselves or others, but the clinician would be swayed by an instinctive fear: ‘ “… the hairs go up on the back of your neck’” (CPN, 2/045). Another CPN spoke of a man whom she felt fitted into the DSPD category:
He actually scared me and if I come out feeling scared that is a good indication because I do not scare easily. (2/042)
This was a client group with whom practitioners were reluctant to work, because they were often unpleasant to encounter and difficult to engage. They were described as ‘ “heart-sink patients’” (psychiatrist, 2/056) who were ‘ “unrewarding and risky’” to take on (social worker, 2/059), and essentially ‘ “not nice people… nobody wants them.’” (CPN, F027). Part of the reluctance to work with these clients was due to the disruptive effects that they were anticipated to have upon an inpatient unit; they were seen as egocentric, attention-seeking and manipulative, capable of ‘ “working the system’” (cf. Goffman 1961). Consequently, there were feelings of resentment toward the clients, who were seen as undeserving of care: ‘ “I feel angry that he is taking advantage of us … using our resources’” (psychologist, F035). However, some participants expressed more sympathetic and paternal attitudes, particularly toward individuals who had clearly had troubled childhoods. They were seen as having ‘ “complex needs’” or being ‘ “vulnerable’” and ‘ “damaged’,,” and thus as much in need of protection as the public they supposedly threatened.
13.4.3Implicit and Eexplicit Vvalues
When talking about DSPD, the practitioners’ comments indicate that they drew upon the six aforementioned models of mental disorder described by Columbo et al. (2003): medical, social, cognitive–-behavioral, psychotherapeutic, family, and conspiratorial. Additionally, these seemed to operate in relation to both ‘ “implicit’” and ‘ “explicit’” values, of which the respondents showed different levels of awareness. Explicit values were those that reflected each professional’s occupational position and training, whereas implicit values tended to reveal the respondents’ personal values, moral judgments, and social attitudes, and sometimes borrowed from the explicit models of other professions. For example, an explicit value for the psychiatrists was to ‘ “act in the patient’s best interests’,,” which often meant detaining them in hospital: Tthis group’s professional training had taught them to identify diagnostic symptoms in whatever cases were presented, and to recommend an appropriate form of treatment. By contrast, an explicit value for the social workers was to use the ‘ “least restrictive option’,,” by allowing clients to remain in the community unless they posed a serious risk to others. They did suggest some forms of treatment, such as anger management classes, but felt that these should be offered on an outpatient basis. Furthermore, because each interviewee’s explicit model reflected his or hertheir occupational training, it was not the case that the medical model gained universal support. Social workers, for example, were more explicitly committed to the social, family, or conspiratorial models, drawing on the medical model only implicitly.
Implicit values often leaked out in the context of reflective afterthoughts and off-the-cuff remarks during the interviews. Respondents would give the answer that they thought they ‘ “ought”’ to give, but then temper it with a personal opinion. For example, when asked whether she thought that DSPD was treatable, a social worker said, ‘ “It depends whether you would like my very personal opinion or what I have been told.’” (2/053).
Consequently, we found evidence of conflict between the values held, both within an individual’s account and between the individuals in CMHTs. In the extracts below, I demonstrate how each of these types of conflict can result in a ‘ “slide to pragmatism’”: wWhen uncertain or under pressure to make a decision, mental health professionals turn to whichever model is safest, most conventional, and least controversial to use within the context of their own occupational work role, and whichever is most pragmatic, given the legislation and services they have to work with.
13.4.4Individual Ppractitioners’ Aambivalence
Firstly, there may be a contradiction between the values people cite explicitly and those they privately endorse. Sometimes this clash of values was obvious and recognized by the respondents themselves. This was most apparent in the responses of psychiatrists, who wanted to express dissatisfaction with the system in which they had been trained. For example, one explained that this profession would regard DSPD as a ‘ “disorder’” but that they personally did not equate this with the idea of ‘ “illness’” : ‘ “… it’s just describing a kind of person … [whose behavior is] outside of what is acceptable by society … there is often little about them that distinguishes them from the rest of us’” (1/020; medical + conspiratorial models).
At other times, the contradiction was more subtle, as the implicit models ‘ “leaked’” out in throwaway remarks made after the respondent’s self-conscious statement. For example, a psychiatrist responded to the vignette of ‘ “Stephen’” by pointing to indicators of ‘ “bipolar affective disorder’,,” ‘ “substance abuse,’” and ‘ “drug-induced psychosis’,” but also referred to Stephen’s ‘ “psychosexual development’” and ‘ “traumatic childhood’” and more external factors such as ‘ “… social deprivation, violence in the family home … housing, education’” (F/063; medical + psychotherapeutic + social + family models). Moreover, while suggesting that he might be treated with antipsychotic drugs, he acknowledged that it was difficult to determine Stephen’s treatability because ‘ “… these are concepts which are very ill defined.’” This demonstrates an explicit adherence to the medical model, but an implicit leaning toward the social, family, and conspiratorial models. This interviewee knew that he ought to cite conventional psychiatric wisdom, but felt uneasy about incorporating it into his own system of values. Similarly, a psychologist admitted that she felt it was, ‘ “… wrong to take somebody in just for detention. Wrong morally and wrong legally’” (F/038). Psychiatrists sometimes resolved the incongruity between their explicit and implicit values by rationaliszing their decisions. For example, those who privately felt that personality disordered individuals ‘ “… should not be locked up’” (psychiatrist, 2/044), but whose professional training encouraged them to offer inpatient treatment, justified their decision to themselves by reasoning that it was ‘ “… in [a client’’s] best interests’” to be detained, to prevent the clientm from offending or from exacerbating a drug addiction.
A similar pattern was observed among the CPNs, who were aware of many factors affecting a client’s supposed dangerousness. This was reflected in the comments of one CPN who spoke of ‘ “… medication management … to reduce the level of agitation or anger’,” but also said, in response to the vignette, that he would want to ‘ “… look at his cognitive functioning’” and that ‘ “… social history is all-important’” (1/016; medical + cognitive–-behavioral + social models). The CPNs seemed to express the least dissatisfaction with any particular model, perhaps because they had been trained to use a more holistic approach, and were in any case ultimately answerable to the hierarchical authority of psychiatrists.
Finally, several social workers used the medical model implicitly in contrast to their avowed commitment to the social model. For example, one spoke in general terms about ‘ “… relationship problems and work issues’” and claimed that ‘ “… most self-harm is a reaction to life events rather than mental health problems’,,” but when discussing the vignette, suggested that an appropriate treatment plan would involve ‘ “… a detox …  observe him for behavior changes, mood swings etc. … [and then] introduce one of the new smart drugs such as Risperidone, Olanzepine or whatever’” (2/051). Some social workers, like the psychiatrists, tried to rationalizse their willingness to detain clients by suggesting that they might benefit from ‘ “humane containment’,” although in this case the contradiction was the reverse of that observed in the psychiatrists: sSsocial workers were caught between an explicit value of individual freedom and an implicit feeling that these clients should not be released. Nevertheless, as with the psychiatrists, this apparent contradiction might simply reflect a pragmatic realization of what would be done to treat such patients, in spite of any personal reservations about what ought (not) to be done.
13.4.5Conflicting vValues within Mmulti-disciplinary Tteams
We also found evidence of competing values and underlying pragmatic interests in the models held by the representatives of different professional groups within the multidisciplinary teams, even if each of these individuals’ explicit and implicit values were congruent. This reflected the ethical debate about treatability versus risk, outlined above: Ppractitioners’ views on the relative importance of these factors were shaped by a combination of the values they had been taught in their professional training, and the practical implications of the decision for their own workloads. A typical example came from this psychiatrist:
It will be split right down the middle. I might be the big softy who will say, ‘ “let’'s give him a chance, let’'s see if there are areas we can help with, let’'s see if we can try and engage him or prepare him to engage with the psychotherapy service’..” Not to detain him because I don’'t think I will get past that barrier.… The other side will say that it is pointless, ‘ “we have had so many patients like this and what did they do? They cause mayhem and we had to get the police to remove them’” this will often be a very senior nursing point of view.… The community nurses will also be asking, ‘ “what can we do? We don’'t have the expertise to deal with these people.…’” (2/056)
Similarly, a social worker observed that the members of the teams followed different approaches according to their explicit values:
ASWs [Approved Social Workers] definitely come at things from a different viewpoint. I am particularly concerned about nurses doing it [risk assessment] because their training is such that they are used to doing as they told by the doctors. I don’'t mean that in a derogatory sense but also they work from a systems approach whereas we work from a needs approach. So I think that we are better placed to look at the holistic needs of the whole family and the surrounding community.’ (2/062)
In other cases, there appeared to be a conflict between the implicit values held by the individuals within a professional group, as, for example, psychiatrists held different views. Although each group had been socialiszed into the same set of explicit, official values, they varied in the more subtle, personal views that they held and the way that they regarded their clients, and so case meetings about particular clients could result in different risk assessments. For example, one psychologist observed how doctors interpreted the ‘ “safety takes precedence’” maxim differently:
My perception is that psychiatrists differ and that the psychologists hold the decision-making process. One of the psychiatrists is not so much concerned as to whether or not they are going to be treatable as, ‘ “is being detained going to reduce the symptoms or help them to manage better or do they pose such a risk to themselves?’.” The other is much more around the definition that we have got there and actually doing something to reduce the symptoms and the difficulties. For the one, risk is much higher up the list of issues. For the other, treatability is much more of an issue.’ (1/033)
Discussions about a client’s potential treatability often evoked these conflicts of values, because each profession had different ideas about what being ‘ “treatable’” meant and what ‘ “treatment’” might involve. Few of the respondents included mere detainment within this category, but in pointing to clinical interventions, different examples were cited, such as medication, drug and alcohol rehabilitation, and anger management classes. As one social worker explained:
This chap on the unit for example, I would say he is treatable.… Then you have got some doctors who will say that the tribunal [a review board that considers patients’ appeals against detention and/or treatment decisions] has decided he is untreatable and there is nothing that we can do for this bloke. Even within psychiatry you have got people who will say he is treatable and others who will say he is not. From a social worker’'s point of view we are not usually in a position to say whether somebody is treatable or not. We would not necessarily have much say. Psychologists on the whole will say that people are treatable rather than not. Nurses in the community team will say he is untreatable because they are used in dealing with people on a short-term basis. ‘ “Untreatable’” in this context will mean ‘ “untreatable in this setting’..” Most people will be looking at it within the remit of their resource and whether they are able to find resource that will meet that need.’ (F/037)
13.4.6Reluctant Eempowerment
The disputes within the CMHTs reflected each occupational group’s interests in protecting their own professional reputation, and in the possible consequences of making a ‘ “wrong’” decision. These were more serious for some than for others, depending on their positions within the hierarchy of responsibility: eEeven though the discussions were ostensibly democratic, there was an implicit recognition that the psychiatrists held the ultimate responsibility for the decisions that were made, and so had most at stake. Nevertheless, each professional group was concerned with its own accountability, and expressed values that were self-protective as well as altruistic. In particular, we noted that many respondents wanted to ‘ “err on the side of caution’,” but that this meant different things to different occupational groups.
Psychiatrists were the most inclined to detain clients, interpreting the risk of harming oneself or others as being of greater significance than protecting the individual’s right to freedom. On the one hand, this reflected their avowed commitment to ‘ “acting in the patient’s best interests’” (an explicit value), for they believed that the longer term therapeutic benefits of intervention would outweigh any immediate reservations clients had about being treated. On the other hand, the psychiatrists were more aware that making such decisions represented the ‘ “safe’” option, serving strategically to protect themselves from criticism. If they had offered a client treatment, and even imposed it against his or her will, then they had ‘ “covered themselves’” and could not so easily be blamed for any future ‘ “dangerousness’”: iIin the words of one psychiatrist, ‘ “… you have tried, you have done your natural best for that person’” (F/034). Thus detaining high- risk clients served as an insurance policy of sorts, protecting the doctor as much as the client. For pragmatic reasons, they dismissed their colleagues’ pleas (and indeed their own disquietude) that such individuals were ‘ “not treatable in our service’,” and found themselves complicit in the re-medicalization of anti-social conduct. One CPN exemplified this view:
… at least then if that person is discharged, or you do the treatment and you don’t get anywhere with them, then when they do offend— - because they are a time bomb waiting to explode— - you can get out your paper and say, ‘ “we tried.’” (2/050).
However, the psychiatrists often felt uneasy about this. For example, when discussing the case vignette, one psychiatrist said that she might have personal reservations about detaining people, and regret the pressure this would put upon others in the CMHT. Nevertheless, she recognized that in practice, these would be overridden by concerns about risk—a slide to pragmatism:
I think that they [CPN and probation officer] would be wanting him to go on Section 3 [a legally enforceable order for compulsory treatment for up to six months, under Section 3 of the UK Mental Health Act 1983], but I would be thinking that on the ward they would not be very happy. They would be saying, ‘ “look, he hasn’'t got a psychiatric problem. He doesn’'t have to take an acute bed.’” So I’'m sure that the colleagues will be divided as well. Inpatient setting will be saying, ‘ “we don’'t want him”’ and the community will be too worried to take him back. It is pulling in both directions.… In practice I think he would go on Section 3. He will go on Section 3 whether at that stage whether people think that he is completely treatable or not. It is that risk.… I think practically we would not discharge him. We would err on the side of the risk … With his condition if he takes drugs it is likely that he will deteriorate further but otherwise I think he may just continue the way he is. Theoretically you could justify it in this way. (2/044)
Social workers, meanwhile, were wary of sectioning clients because it represented a possible infringement of their civil liberties. Their explicit occupational value was to ‘ “use the least restrictive option’”— - that is, to let the client remain in the community. However, alongside these altruistic endeavors, they too cited concerns about being accused of professional misconduct (they could be held legally responsible if a client was either detained without evidence of their mental illness, or released and then committed a violent offense) and held some grave personal reservations about the power they wielded. For example, this social worker said:
I want to be sure that I’'m making an application on solid legal grounds and following a thorough and appropriate assessment and good consultation with everybody involved, and I will record that.… Being cynical, you have the ability as an ASW or even as a recommended doctor to take some pieces of information and use them any way you want to. You have that power. You have that professional independence. There is information in this paper that I could use to support an application [to section] if I had two medical recommendations. There is also information in here that I could use to challenge an application so it is very much an ‘ “on the day’” thing.… On one level I am thinking, ‘ “discharge this guy. He is not ill’,,” but this was not a detention issue. The other side of it was that he was a risk … what would I say if he set fire to some papers in the B&B? I would be held accountable for that decision.’ (2/059)
By contrast, CPNs and OTs (Occupational Therapists) had the least to lose in this respect, because their opinions would be subsumed beneath the ultimate decision-making authority of the doctors: Aas one social worker put it, they were ‘ “used to doing as they are told’.” (2/062). One CPN indicated that she was relieved not to have to bear the responsibility for any ‘ “wrong’” decisions, and gladly shared the burden with her team:
I can assess the risk but I wouldn’'t want the responsibility of saying, ‘ “yes, take them away’,,” unless I was part of a team. It is one of those things, don’'t you find, you want it to be done but you don’'t want to do it yourself. I don’'t want to pull the string. (2/042)
Thus it was recognized by all that, although they were working as a multi-disciplinary team, the psychiatrists, as medical doctors, held the most power in making treatment decisions. While some of the respondents were content with this (as the above comment shows), others expressed feelings of resentment. For example, some social workers observed that the doctors made only the most fleeting appearance at team meetings, and would have spent much less time with the clients than they had themselves,, yet still had the power to determine the outcome. One social worker reflected bitterly,
Often in a case like this you will find that what happens is that the consultant saw the bloke in the ward round, made a Section 3 recommendation and has left the country. You have really got to fight in some cases to track the consultant down to get them to the meeting.… He makes his decision and signs a medical recommendation form and leaves it on the ward. Trying get him back or to even talk to him can be like a major difficulty.… You have only got to work with them for a while and you see that consultant psychiatrists have enormous power, even the ones that are quite approachable and continually refer to themselves as ‘ “team members’” or ‘ “community focused’..” They are still extremely powerful people. You need only watch the way that patients defer to them and the way that CPNs will rush around at their bidding. If a consultant is to ask for a form, before he has finished asking three people will have rushed up to get it.… A consultant will turn up with his ivory, golden-nibbed pen and everything is brought to him. It is a structural thing.’ (2/059)
Another social worker expressed a similar view but was more diplomatic:
‘… logistics do sometimes mean that all the parties do not make it to be present at the ward round … [but] I think that the views of nurses are usually given quite a lot of importance because often RMOs [Resident Medical Officers] are not seeing very much of somebody. They are flying in and out of the ward …... the hierarchicalism within the medical world puts much more weight on the word of the doctor than on a nurse.’ (2/052)
However, this distribution of power was also experienced as problematic by the doctors themselves, insofar as they felt out of their depth in making treatment decisions about what they perceived to be a nebulous condition. As one psychiatrist put it, they were ‘ “… pinned like butterflies’” (F/063) in a Catch- 22 situation, because whichever decision they made could turn out retrospectively to have been ‘ “wrong’..” They were working with concepts that they felt were difficult to define, such as ‘ “therapeutic benefit’” and ‘ “dangerousness’,” and were often unsure about who, what, and how to treat. A psychologist confessed that, ‘ “… we are only right half the time … it is soft data in a soft science’” (F/035), and a psychiatrist agreed that, ‘ “… we may miss important facts and facets of an individual’” (F/063). One CPN observed that patients were, ‘ “… caught up in a service which doesn’t know what it is supposed to be doing.’” (2/046), and another agreed that, ‘ “… we go on a wing and a prayer’” (2/058).
13.4.7Constraints and Ppressures
Another factor influencing the decisions practitioners made was the limited resources available to them. They were aware that, even if they could identify features of DSPD that might be amenable to treatment (such as drug and alcohol addiction, or difficulties with anger management), they had only limited amounts of funding, time, and facilities to offer clients. This reflects wider, ongoing debates about the rationing of health care resources within the UK’s National Health Service and the pressure to deliver cost-efficient services (Busfield 2001). Thus we could detect an underlying conflict between the Hippocratic principle to which the staff adhered (to do good and to treat where possible) and the lived experience they had of working in a service in which demand for resources outstripped supply. One of the psychiatrists remarked that there was often a discrepancy between what they would like to provide in the ‘ “ideal’” therapeutic service, and the reality of what they could actually provide within the constraints of a general psychiatric ward (F/039). Although this psychiatrist had worked in a specialist personality disorder unit, there are not many of these in the UK, and he recognized that he was unusually lucky to have such resources:
In practice the general psychiatrist just might not make a recommendation because they don’'t think they can on their unit.… They are treatable in an ideal service … with a stable therapeutic environment which includes group anger management and substance abuse therapy, etc., etc., but I think that the general psychiatrist will very often be justified in saying that they are not treatable in their service.’ (F/039)
Insofar as personality disordered clients were identified as being unrewarding or difficult to work with (unable to recognize that they had a ‘ “problem’,,” disruptive of other patients, and unwilling to comply with treatment regimes), the staff were often reluctant to accept such people into their care. These clients were perceived to take up disproportionate amounts of staff time, bed space and places within therapy groups, while seeming never to get ‘ “better’” or to engage with the therapeutic interventions: Tthey were a ‘ “waste’” of time, energy, and money. To the staff, these resources were precious, and there were other clients who were deemed to be more ‘ “deserving’” of care. As one psychiatrist said:
If they are unmanageable but if there is a genuine psychiatric illness then the ward would not say anything, but if it is due to a personality problem[’s], disrupting the activities of the ward then they would think that they should not be wasting an acute bed because we have a dearth of beds. (2/044)
13.5Conclusion
Mental health professionals express a complex set of attitudes to ‘ “risky’” personality disordered individuals and to the concept of DSPD, combining different theoretical models to explain its origins and features. The use of these models reflects both explicit values (based on occupational training) and implicit values (based on personal, subjective beliefs and experiences of clients). Consequently, this study revealed conflicting values both within and between individual members of multi-disciplinary teams. This supports the view that risk assessment, diagnosis, and management planning are not simply objective and rational procedures, but rather social processes of interaction and negotiation involving struggles for power (Green et al. 2002).
These conflicts of values tend to be resolved by a ‘ “slide to pragmatism’,,” whereby each practitioner decides to ‘ “err on the side of caution’” in decisions about a client’s treatability. This means making whichever choice will be least risky for their own professional reputation, and most pragmatic, given the resources available. The collective decisions of a CMHT therefore depend not only on the risk assessments that they make about a client’s potential ‘ “dangerousness’,,” but also on the risks that each occupational group perceives for itself, in terms of being held accountable for ‘ “wrong’” decisions. As Abbott (1988:, 33) argues, ‘ “Each profession is bound to a set of tasks by ties of jurisdiction, the strengths and weaknesses of these ties being established in the process of actual professional work’..” With contested conditions like DSPD, clinicians are themselves aware of the provisional, incomplete, and value-laden process of clinical decision- making, and so reflect on the threats this poses to their professional integrity. The approach of Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is extremely useful in helping to understand the myriad ways in which explicit and implicit values interact, shaping every stage of the clinical encounter with ‘ “risky’” personality disordered individuals.
However, there are some limitations in terms of whether and how the approach might bey applied in practice. Firstly, within a multi-disciplinary team, staff representing different occupations will have different levels of power and status, and so some models (and their incumbent values) will be listened to more than others. Secondly, even in the most democratic and egalitarian of teams, there will be structural constraints upon the kinds of treatments available to patients. Medicalized drug treatments are much cheaper than courses of psychotherapy, and so ‘ “the slide to pragmatism’” in terms of a recourse to the medical model may be inevitable. Thirdly, where VBM suggests involving service users in the decisions made about their treatment, this may be practically and ethically challenging with ‘ “risky’” personality disordered individuals. On a practical level, they may simply be unwilling to attend CMHT meetings because they do not see themselves as ill or in need of help. Additionally, given that manipulation and deceit are common features of anti-social personality disorders, it may be difficult to understand the values and needs of people classified as such. Meanwhile, on an ethical level, it may be questionable whether this client group should be involved in these decisions, insofar as they are deemed a danger to other people: Iif a client expresses an interest in being released from hospital even though the staff feel that s/hethe individual is dangerous, should his or her view be listened to? Should people whose expressed values endorse violence be considered equal partners in the decision-making process? Similar concerns might be raised about involving family members and carers in the decision-making process, if there is evidence of childhood abuse within the client’s history. This reflects the inevitable power relations inherent in any form of health care provision, especially psychiatry: Tto paraphrase Orwell (1945/2008 [1945]), all values may be equal, but some are more equal than others. Despite such challenges, however, the VBM approach encourages a more balanced, holistic understanding of DSPD and its management.
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